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Abstract
We examine the social, economic, and cultural determinants of “repartnering” after
a divorce. Our analysis improves upon earlier research in three ways: (1) our study
includes more direct measures of theoretical concepts; (2) we study both marriage
and cohabitation after divorce and analyze them as competing risks; (3) we
incorporate information about the meeting setting in our event-history models.
Competing-risk models estimated on a large-scale sample of ever-divorced persons
in the Netherlands offer limited support for economic theories of marriage. Stronger
support is obtained for social theories of marriage, which emphasize the role of
meeting and mating opportunities in the “remarriage market,” and for cultural
theories of marriage, which stress the importance of individualistic orientations.
Some people stay single after divorce, while others enter a new marital or
cohabiting relationship. Knowing who enters a new union and who does not is
important for several reasons. First, remarriage may be used as a strategy to
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overcome some of the negative consequences of divorce. After divorce, women
often experience a decline in economic well-being, but the decline is often offset
by marrying a new husband (Duncan & Hoffman 1985). Similarly, many men
and women experience a loss of well-being and feelings of loneliness when their
first marriage ends, but such effects can be reduced by remarrying (Amato
2000). Obviously, remarriage is not the only way to solve such problems, and
remarriage may also introduce new problems, such as conflicts between the
new partner and the children (Furstenberg & Cherlin 1991). Nevertheless,
remarriage can limit the negative consequences of divorce and should therefore
be an integral part of the divorce debate (Smock 1990; Sweeney 1997).
A second reason that remarriage is important lies on the macro level. Many
Western observers have argued that declining marriage rates and rising rates
of cohabitation and divorce signal a declining preference or “taste” for
marriage (Bumpass 1990). In this cultural interpretation of demographic
trends, doubts have risen as well about the viability of marriage as an institution.
Remarriage plays an important role in this debate, because if remarriage rates
are high, it would seem incorrect to regard divorce as a definite sign that the
institution of marriage is fading (Cherlin 1992). The combination of frequent
divorce and frequent remarriage points to other factors that may cause marital
instability and suggests that a model of sequential marital monogamy fits the
new era better. This reasoning also depends on how many people cohabit after
divorce. If a low rate of remarriage is compensated by a high rate of
cohabitation, the thesis of a weakening marriage institution is still a valid
interpretation of demographic trends.
A third reason for studying the determinants of remarriage is theoretical.
In the recent past, prevailing economic and sociological theories of marriage
have often been applied to first marriage formation and to marital stability
(Becker 1981; Oppenheimer 1988). In our view, applications to remarriage may
provide a novel and stronger test of such theories than data on first marriage.
Not all people remarry, whereas most people marry at least once. First marriage
is primarily a matter of “when”; remarriage is also a matter of “if,” in particular
for people who divorce at later ages. Research on marriage formation has shown
that many economic hypotheses are more applicable to the occurrence of
marriage itself than to its timing (Oppenheimer 1997). Since the remarriage
rate is smaller than the first marriage rate, remarriage data may offer a more
obvious way to address these hypotheses.
The determinants of remarriage have been studied before (e.g., Lampard &
Peggs 1999; Smock 1990; Spanier & Glick 1980; Sweeney 1997), but the number
of studies is small and the research area is not growing. In this article, we try
to enhance our understanding of the remarriage process by introducing three
new elements to the literature. First, previous research has focused only on
demographic or basic economic factors affecting remarriage, such as age at
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divorce, gender, children, and education. We broaden this focus by considering
a more elaborate set of economic characteristics and by adding social and
cultural factors to the remarriage model. Social hypotheses emphasize
opportunities people face in the second marriage market, while cultural
hypotheses emphasize the preferences that people have about the institution
of marriage. Second, we consider both marriage and cohabitation after divorce
and analyze these events as competing risks. By comparing the two events, we
gain more insight into the validity of cultural hypotheses about the decline of
marriage. Third, we have information about the type of context in which people
met their new spouse. By incorporating such meeting settings as competing
risks in our event-history models, we are better able to separate interpretations
in terms of marriage market opportunity from interpretations in terms of
(economic) needs.
To examine the determinants of remarriage, we analyze life-history data on
ever-divorced persons in the Netherlands. As in other Western European
countries, divorce rates in the Netherlands have increased over the past decades.
Life table estimates show that about 25% of all new marriages eventually end
in divorce (Statistics Netherlands 1999). After divorce, 60% of the men and a
little over 40% of the women will eventually remarry (Statistics Netherlands
1999). Even though these numbers are high, remarriage in the Netherlands is
less common than it is in the U.S. The yearly Dutch remarriage rate in the
1980s is about 50 per 1,000 divorced women (Statistics Netherlands 1999),
whereas the American remarriage rate is about 90 (Bumpass, Sweet & Martin
1990). Official statistics do not include persons who are cohabiting with a new
partner, and so the “repartnering” rate will be higher than what the remarriage
rate suggests (Uunk 1999). In the Netherlands, cohabitation is a widely used
alternative to marriage (Manting 1994) and only a small minority of the
population has negative opinions about cohabitation (Esveldt et al. 2001).
American research has furthermore suggested that the trend toward increased
cohabitation was led by the divorced, so that unmarried cohabitation seems
to be a more important alternative for remarriage than it is for first marriage
(Bumpass & Sweet 1989).
Previous Studies on Remarriage Differentials
While many studies in the past have focused on the content and stability of
second marriages, and in particular on the internal dynamics of stepfamilies
(Cherlin 1978; Cherlin & Furstenberg 1994; Coleman, Ganong & Fine 2000),
little is known about who finds a new spouse and who does not. In Table 1, we
present an overview of the most important European and American studies
on the timing and occurrence of remarriage after divorce. Our overview focuses
1462 / Social Forces  81:4, June 2003
TA
B
LE
 1
:
R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
M
et
ho
ds
 a
n
d 
R
es
u
lt
s 
in
 A
n
al
ys
es
 o
f 
R
em
ar
ri
ag
e 
D
et
er
m
in
an
ts
: 
P
ri
n
ci
pa
l 
Po
st
-1
98
0 
St
u
di
es
O
cc
u
p
at
io
n
al
O
th
er
 X
St
u
d
ya
C
o
u
n
tr
y
Y
 V
ar
ia
bl
e
D
es
ig
n
Sa
m
p
le
E
d
u
ca
ti
on
C
h
il
d
re
n
A
ge
 A
sp
ec
ts
R
el
ig
io
n
St
at
u
s
V
ar
ia
b
le
s
(1
)
K
o
o
U
SA
R
em
ar
ri
ag
e
Fu
ll 
m
ar
it
al
W
o
m
en
—
N
eg
at
iv
e
N
eg
at
iv
e
—
—
—
19
80
(a
ft
er
 d
iv
or
ce
)
h
is
to
ry
ef
fe
ct
ef
fe
ct
(o
n
ly
 f
or
(d
iv
or
ce
 a
ge
)
yo
u
n
g
d
iv
or
ce
d
pe
op
le
, 
n
o
ag
e 
ki
d
ef
fe
ct
)
(2
)
M
o
tt
U
SA
R
em
ar
ri
ag
e
Fi
rs
t 
5 
ye
ar
s
W
o
m
en
N
eg
at
iv
e
N
o 
ef
fe
ct
N
o 
ef
fe
ct
—
N
eg
at
iv
e
C
ha
n
ge
 i
n
19
83
(a
ft
er
 d
iv
or
ce
)
af
te
r 
di
vo
rc
e
ef
fe
ct
ef
fe
ct
fi
n
an
ce
s,
(e
m
p
lo
ym
en
t)
h
ea
lt
h
,
N
o 
ef
fe
ct
w
el
fa
re
(w
or
k 
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
)
re
ce
ip
t,
br
ok
en
h
o
m
e
(3
)
K
o
o
U
SA
R
em
ar
ri
ag
e
Fu
ll 
m
ar
it
al
W
o
m
en
N
eg
at
iv
e
N
eg
at
iv
e
N
eg
at
iv
e
N
eg
at
iv
e
—
R
eg
io
n
,
19
84
(a
ft
er
 d
iv
or
ce
)
h
is
to
ry
ef
fe
ct
ef
fe
ct
ef
fe
ct
ef
fe
ct
di
vo
rc
e
(n
o 
ag
e
(d
iv
or
ce
 a
ge
)
(C
at
h
o
li
c)
co
h
o
rt
,
ef
fe
ct
)
in
ta
ct
fa
m
il
y
of
 o
ri
gi
n
(4
)
M
at
th
ij
s
B
el
gi
u
m
R
ep
ar
tn
er
in
g
Fu
ll 
m
ar
it
al
W
o
m
en
N
o 
ef
fe
ct
N
eg
at
iv
e
N
eg
at
iv
e
—
—
U
rb
an
iz
at
io
n
19
87
(a
ft
er
 d
iv
or
ce
)
h
is
to
ry
ef
fe
ct
ef
fe
ct
(d
iv
or
ce
 a
ge
)
M
en
N
o 
ef
fe
ct
N
o 
ef
fe
ct
N
o 
ef
fe
ct
—
—
U
rb
an
iz
at
io
n
(d
iv
or
ce
 a
ge
)
 Alternative Routes in the Remarriage Market / 1463
TA
B
LE
 1
:
R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
M
et
ho
ds
 a
n
d 
R
es
u
lt
s 
in
 A
n
al
ys
es
 o
f 
R
em
ar
ri
ag
e 
D
et
er
m
in
an
ts
: P
ri
n
ci
pa
l 
Po
st
-1
98
0 
St
u
di
es
 (
C
on
ti
n
ue
d) O
cc
u
p
at
io
n
al
O
th
er
 X
St
u
d
ya
C
o
u
n
tr
y
Y
 V
ar
ia
bl
e
D
es
ig
n
Sa
m
p
le
E
d
u
ca
ti
on
C
h
il
d
re
n
A
ge
 A
sp
ec
ts
R
el
ig
io
n
St
at
u
s
V
ar
ia
b
le
s
(5
)
B
u
m
p
as
s
U
SA
R
em
ar
ri
ag
e
Fi
rs
t 
5 
ye
ar
s
W
o
m
en
N
o 
ef
fe
ct
N
eg
at
iv
e
N
eg
at
iv
e
—
—
R
eg
io
n
, 
ra
ce
19
90
(a
ft
er
 d
iv
or
ce
)
af
te
r 
di
vo
rc
e
ef
fe
ct
ef
fe
ct
(d
iv
or
ce
 a
ge
 +
m
ar
ri
ag
e 
ag
e)
(6
)
C
h
is
w
ic
k
U
SA
R
ep
ar
tn
er
in
g
Fu
ll 
m
ar
it
al
W
o
m
en
N
o 
ef
fe
ct
N
eg
at
iv
e
N
eg
at
iv
e
N
o 
ef
fe
ct
—
R
eg
io
n
19
90
(a
ft
er
 d
iv
or
ce
 +
h
is
to
ry
(w
h
it
es
)
ef
fe
ct
ef
fe
ct
(C
at
h
o
li
c)
w
id
o
w
h
o
o
d
(d
iv
or
ce
 a
ge
)
(7
)
K
le
in
G
er
m
an
y
R
em
ar
ri
ag
e
Fu
ll 
m
ar
it
al
W
o
m
en
N
eg
at
iv
e
Po
si
ti
ve
N
eg
at
iv
e
—
Po
si
ti
ve
U
rb
an
iz
at
io
n
,
19
90
(a
ft
er
 d
iv
or
ce
)
h
is
to
ry
ef
fe
ct
ef
fe
ct
ef
fe
ct
ef
fe
ct
m
ig
ra
ti
o
n
(d
iv
or
ce
 a
ge
)
(o
cc
u
p
at
io
n
al
st
at
u
s)
M
en
Po
si
ti
ve
—
N
eg
at
iv
e
—
Po
si
ti
ve
U
rb
an
iz
at
io
n
,
ef
fe
ct
ef
fe
ct
ef
fe
ct
m
ig
ra
ti
o
n
(d
iv
or
ce
 a
ge
)
(o
cc
u
p
at
io
n
al
st
at
u
s)
(8
)
Sm
oc
k
U
SA
R
em
ar
ri
ag
e
Fu
ll 
m
ar
it
al
W
o
m
en
N
o 
ef
fe
ct
N
eg
at
iv
e
N
eg
at
iv
e
—
—
D
iv
or
ce
19
90
(a
ft
er
 d
iv
or
ce
)
h
is
to
ry
(w
h
it
es
)
ef
fe
ct
ef
fe
ct
co
h
o
rt
Po
si
ti
ve
(d
iv
or
ce
 a
ge
 +
ef
fe
ct
m
ar
ri
ag
e 
ag
e)
(b
la
ck
s)
(9
)
Sp
an
ie
r
U
SA
R
em
ar
ri
ag
e
Fi
rs
t 
5 
ye
ar
s
W
o
m
en
N
o 
ef
fe
ct
N
eg
at
iv
e
N
eg
at
iv
e
—
—
—
19
90
(a
ft
er
 d
iv
or
ce
)
af
te
r 
di
vo
rc
e
(e
xc
ep
t
ef
fe
ct
ef
fe
ct
co
lle
ge
(d
iv
or
ce
 a
ge
 +
gr
ad
s)
m
ar
ri
ag
e 
ag
e)
(C
on
ti
nu
ed
 o
n 
ne
xt
 p
ag
e)
1464 / Social Forces  81:4, June 2003
TA
B
LE
 1
:
R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
M
et
ho
ds
 a
n
d 
R
es
u
lt
s 
in
 A
n
al
ys
es
 o
f 
R
em
ar
ri
ag
e 
D
et
er
m
in
an
ts
: P
ri
n
ci
pa
l 
Po
st
-1
98
0 
St
u
di
es
 (
C
on
ti
n
ue
d) O
cc
u
p
at
io
n
al
O
th
er
 X
St
u
d
ya
C
o
u
n
tr
y
Y
 V
ar
ia
bl
e
D
es
ig
n
Sa
m
p
le
E
d
u
ca
ti
on
C
h
il
d
re
n
A
ge
 A
sp
ec
ts
R
el
ig
io
n
St
at
u
s
V
ar
ia
b
le
s
(1
0)
W
u
C
an
ad
a
R
ec
oh
ab
it
at
io
n
Fu
ll 
m
ar
it
al
W
o
m
en
N
o 
ef
fe
ct
N
eg
at
iv
e
N
eg
at
iv
e
N
o 
ef
fe
ct
—
R
eg
io
n
,
19
94
a
(a
ft
er
 d
iv
or
ce
)
h
is
to
ry
ef
fe
ct
ef
fe
ct
(C
at
h
ol
ic
,
d
iv
or
ce
(d
iv
or
ce
 a
ge
 +
P
ro
te
st
an
t)
co
h
o
rt
m
ar
ri
ag
e 
ag
e)
M
en
N
o 
ef
fe
ct
N
o 
ef
fe
ct
N
eg
at
iv
e
N
o 
ef
fe
ct
—
R
eg
io
n
,
ef
fe
ct
(C
at
h
ol
ic
,
d
iv
or
ce
(d
iv
or
ce
 a
ge
 +
 P
ro
te
st
an
t)
co
h
o
rt
m
ar
ri
ag
e 
ag
e)
(1
1)
W
u
C
an
ad
a
R
em
ar
ri
ag
e
Fu
ll 
m
ar
it
al
W
o
m
en
N
o 
ef
fe
ct
N
eg
at
iv
e
N
eg
at
iv
e
N
eg
at
iv
e
—
R
eg
io
n
,
19
94
b
(a
ft
er
 d
iv
or
ce
 +
h
is
to
ry
ef
fe
ct
ef
fe
ct
 e
ff
ec
t
m
ar
ri
ag
e
w
id
o
w
h
o
o
d
)
(d
iv
or
ce
 a
ge
)
(C
at
h
ol
ic
,
m
ar
ke
t
P
ro
te
st
an
t)
va
ri
ab
le
M
en
Po
si
ti
ve
N
o 
ef
fe
ct
Po
si
ti
ve
Po
si
ti
ve
—
R
eg
io
n
,
ef
fe
ct
ef
fe
ct
ef
fe
ct
m
ar
ri
ag
e
(d
iv
or
ce
 a
ge
;
(C
at
h
ol
ic
,
m
ar
ke
t
co
n
fo
u
n
d
ed
)
P
ro
te
st
an
t)
va
ri
ab
le
(1
2)
Sw
ee
n
ey
U
SA
R
em
ar
ri
ag
e
Fu
ll 
m
ar
it
al
W
o
m
en
N
o 
ef
fe
ct
N
eg
at
iv
e
N
eg
at
iv
e
N
o 
ef
fe
ct
N
o 
ef
fe
ct
W
o
rk
19
97
(a
ft
er
 d
iv
or
ce
 +
h
is
to
ry
ef
fe
ct
ef
fe
ct
(C
at
h
o
li
c)
(e
xp
er
ie
n
ce
as
p
ir
at
io
n
,
w
id
o
w
h
o
o
d
)
(d
iv
or
ce
 a
ge
 +
d
u
ri
n
g
m
en
ta
l
m
ar
ri
ag
e 
ag
e)
m
ar
ri
ag
e)
ab
ili
ty
,
br
ok
en
 h
om
e
M
en
N
o 
ef
fe
ct
N
eg
at
iv
e
N
eg
at
iv
e
N
eg
at
iv
e
N
o 
ef
fe
ct
Sa
m
e
ef
fe
ct
ef
fe
ct
ef
fe
ct
(o
cc
u
p
at
io
n
al
(d
iv
or
ce
 a
ge
 +
(C
at
h
o
li
c)
st
at
u
s)
m
ar
ri
ag
e 
ag
e)
 Alternative Routes in the Remarriage Market / 1465
TA
B
LE
 1
:
R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
M
et
ho
ds
 a
n
d 
R
es
u
lt
s 
in
 A
n
al
ys
es
 o
f 
R
em
ar
ri
ag
e 
D
et
er
m
in
an
ts
: P
ri
n
ci
pa
l 
Po
st
-1
98
0 
St
u
di
es
 (
C
on
ti
n
ue
d) O
cc
u
p
at
io
n
al
O
th
er
 X
St
u
d
ya
C
o
u
n
tr
y
Y
 V
ar
ia
bl
e
D
es
ig
n
Sa
m
p
le
E
d
u
ca
ti
on
C
h
il
d
re
n
A
ge
 A
sp
ec
ts
R
el
ig
io
n
St
at
u
s
V
ar
ia
b
le
s
(1
3)
U
u
n
k
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
R
ep
ar
tn
er
in
g
Fu
ll 
m
ar
it
al
W
o
m
en
N
o 
ef
fe
ct
N
eg
at
iv
e
N
eg
at
iv
e
—
Po
si
ti
ve
—
19
98
(a
ft
er
 d
iv
or
ce
)
h
is
to
ry
ef
fe
ct
ef
fe
ct
ef
fe
ct
(d
iv
or
ce
 a
ge
)
(o
f 
w
or
k,
n
ot
 o
f 
st
at
u
s)
M
en
Po
si
ti
ve
N
eg
at
iv
e
N
eg
at
iv
e
—
Po
si
ti
ve
 e
ff
ec
t
—
ef
fe
ct
ef
fe
ct
ef
fe
ct
(o
f 
w
or
k 
an
d
(d
iv
or
ce
 a
ge
)
of
 s
ta
tu
s)
(1
4)
L
am
p
ar
d
G
re
at
 B
ri
ta
in
R
ep
ar
tn
er
in
g
Fu
ll 
m
ar
it
al
W
o
m
en
—
N
eg
at
iv
e
N
eg
at
iv
e
—
Po
si
ti
ve
D
iv
or
ce
19
99
(a
ft
er
 d
iv
or
ce
 +
h
is
to
ry
ef
fe
ct
ef
fe
ct
ef
fe
ct
co
h
o
rt
,
w
id
o
w
h
o
o
d
)
(d
iv
or
ce
 a
ge
 +
(c
la
ss
;
co
h
ab
it
at
io
n
m
ar
ri
ag
e 
ag
e)
p
ro
fe
ss
io
n
al
s
in
 f
ir
st
ex
ce
pt
io
n
)
m
ar
ri
ag
e
M
en
—
—
N
eg
at
iv
e
—
Po
si
ti
ve
D
iv
or
ce
ef
fe
ct
ef
fe
ct
co
h
o
rt
,
(d
iv
or
ce
 a
ge
 +
(c
la
ss
)
co
h
ab
it
at
io
n
m
ar
ri
ag
e 
ag
e)
in
 f
ir
st
m
ar
ri
ag
e
a
O
n
ly
 f
ir
st
 a
u
th
or
s 
lis
te
d.
1466 / Social Forces  81:4, June 2003
on sociological, demographic, and economic studies that were published in
professional journals in the 1980s and 1990s. The numbers in parentheses in
the text refer to the studies in Table 1.
There are important differences in the designs of the studies. Most authors
examine divorced people, although a few authors make comparisons with
widows and widowers (6, 11, 12, 14). The type of new relationship differs among
studies as well. Because of data limitations, most studies analyze remarriage
only. A few studies have data on cohabitation after divorce, but those do not
compare the two events with each other (6, 10, 13, 14). Finally, there are
differences in the longitudinal nature of the data. Most studies in the 1980s
and 1990s are based on retrospective life-history data, and they examine
remarriage chances at several points in a person’s postdivorce period. Other
studies are based on panel data, which typically examine the chance of
remarrying between subsequent panel waves (2, 5, 9), a design that is less ideal
because of censoring. A final observation is that virtually all studies present
separate analyses for men and women, in part because the rate of remarriage
is much lower for women than for men and in part because hypotheses on the
determinants of remarriage are often sex-specific.
Which independent variables have been used, and what effects do they
have? The most consistent finding has to do with a person’s life cycle. Virtually
all studies find that older people and people with children are less likely to
remarry. The age effect has been found for both men and women, although it
appears to be stronger for women. Effects of children have been studied less
often for men and are clearly more mixed for them, sometimes negative (12,
13), just as for women, but sometimes not significant (8, 10, 11). While
demographic effects are generally strong and consistent, evidence on the
influence of socioeconomic characteristics is more uncertain. Most studies find
no effect of education on remarriage (4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12), whereas others find
significant positive effects for men (7, 11, 13) and negative effects for women
(2, 3, 7). One study finds a positive effect of education for black women (8).
Work and occupational status have not often been studied, largely because work-
history data are typically lacking or incomplete. Some authors find a positive
effect of occupational status on the remarriage chances of both men and
women (7, 13, 14), but another study finds no effect (12). Effects of woman’s
labor-force participation are mixed as well. One study finds no effect of women’s
labor-force experience on remarriage (12), one study finds a positive effect of
being in the labor force (13), and another study finds a negative effect (2). The
cultural determinants of remarriage have primarily been studied by examining
religious denomination. The evidence seems to suggest that Catholics are less
likely to remarry than others, but effects are small and not consistent across
studies (3, 6, 10, 11, 12).
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The most striking feature of Table 1 is that the number of independent
variables taken together is small. Studies are limited to demographic and
rudimentary economic determinants of remarriage. While demographic effects
are consistent across studies, economic effects are inconsistent. Part of the
reason, we think, is that the magnitude of these effects is small, which may, in
turn, be caused by the fact that in many cases multiple and opposing
interpretations are involved. In general, the literature has provided important
descriptive information on the basic differentials in remarriage probabilities,
but our knowledge of the remarriage process is still incomplete and our
theoretical interpretations of these differentials remain to be examined
empirically. In this contribution, we explore the role of economic influences
in more detail, we test alternative interpretations of such influences, and we
develop and test social and cultural hypotheses about remarriage.
Theory and Hypotheses
To understand remarriage differentials, we start out with presenting three
general arguments about why people enter (married or unmarried) cohabiting
unions: needs, attractiveness, and opportunity (Becker 1981; Goldscheider &
Waite 1986; Oppenheimer 1988). A first basic argument is that people enter a
union because it enhances well-being in various ways, emotionally, financially,
and socially. A partner may provide economic security, affection, and company,
and the greater the need in these respects, the more likely it is that a person
will cohabit. Another important reason is that people marry because they want
to have children. Although arguments about individual needs apply to first as
well as to second marriages, they have a special meaning for remarriage because
the needs of divorced persons are often changed by the first marriage. More
specifically, most women experience a financial deterioration after divorce, and
both men and women may experience a loss in well-being when their marriage
ends. The negative consequences of divorce may create needs that can be filled
by a new marriage. Another difference between first and second marriages lies
in the wish to have children. Children are an important reason for people to
enter a union, and in the case of remarriage, many people already have children
from a prior marriage. Hence, one of the main reasons to marry is much less
relevant for divorced people, and this may make other reasons to marry more
salient.
A second basic argument is that marriage prospects depend on how
attractive a person is to the opposite sex. It has traditionally been argued that
unattractiveness in the marriage market will lead to a lower probability of
marrying (Goldscheider & Waite 1986). In the literature on first marriage, such
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hypotheses are complicated by the fact that attractiveness changes the search
process. For that reason, attractiveness not only affects the chance of ever
marrying, but it also has complex and sometimes contradictory effects on the
timing of marriage (England & Farkas 1986; Lichter et al. 1992; Oppenheimer
1988). In the study of remarriage, the problem may be smaller, since the
proportion of the divorced who remarry is lower than the proportion of first-
married people. Therefore, we think that for remarriage the simple version of
the attractiveness hypothesis is more important than for first marriage. In other
words, the more attractive a person is, the higher the chances of repartnering.
Note that in the remarriage market, there are additional characteristics that
determine who is attractive and who is not. Children from a prior relationship,
for example, may make someone unattractive to a new partner, and potential
partners may perceive the experience of divorce itself as a negative signal.
A third argument is that the probability of marrying depends on the
opportunity to meet someone of the opposite sex. The better the opportunity,
the greater the chance that a person will meet a suitable spouse and the higher
the probability of marriage or cohabitation. In the case of remarriage,
opportunities to find a new partner probably play a greater role than in the
case of first marriage. Divorced people are older than never-married people,
and, at their age, the marriage market may be less effective. This is not only
because the number of single persons is smaller at later ages, but also because
divorced people are less naturally involved in typical marriage markets such
as schools, voluntary associations, and leisure locations (Kalmijn 1998).
Using the three arguments about needs, attractiveness, and meeting
opportunities, we develop hypotheses about the influence of three groups of
characteristics on remarriage: social, economic, and cultural. We not only
differentiate groups of independent variables, but we also differentiate ways
of finding a new spouse and ways of establishing a new relationship.
First, we distinguish ways of finding a new spouse. As we demonstrate later,
there are three main contexts in the remarriage market: finding a spouse
through work, finding a spouse through leisure activities, and finding a spouse
through one’s social network. By including this distinction in the event-history
models, we are better able to assess the role of marriage-market opportunities
and we are able to separate social and economic interpretations of the effects
of economic variables. Women’s occupations, for example, are generally believed
to have both positive and negative effects on remarriage: a negative effect
because work reduces the economic need for a new partner, and a positive effect
because work enlarges opportunities to meet and mate. Our hypothesis is that
if the work effect is based on reduced needs only, it should affect repartnering
regardless of where the new partner is found. If the work effect is based on
meeting opportunities, it should not affect repartnering through settings other
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than the workplace. We introduce this logic as a way of testing hypotheses about
the social and economic influences on remarriage.
Second, we distinguish ways of establishing a new relationship, that is,
marriage versus cohabitation. By making this distinction, we are better able to
test some of the underlying theoretical mechanisms. A well-known hypothesis,
for example, is that progressive values about marriage and the family would
reduce remarriage chances because people with progressive values have
negative opinions about the importance of marriage. If this hypothesis is true,
we should find that values affect only remarriage after divorce, not cohabitation.
If the chances of cohabitation after divorce are also reduced, progressive values
reflect a desire to live alone rather than a rejection of the marriage institution.
This would still be a cultural effect, but its implications are different.
HYPOTHESES ABOUT SOCIAL INTEGRATION
When people want to have a new partner after divorce, they are faced with a
marriage market that is more restricted than the market they faced when they
were young. Given a certain desire for age similarity, it is clear that the
remarriage market is smaller because the number of single people at later ages
is limited. In addition, the remarriage market is more difficult for divorced
women because men marry somewhat younger women and at later ages there
are more women than men. It is not only in the numbers that the remarriage
market is different. When married, people’s networks become smaller and more
connected to the network of the partner (Gerstel 1988). After divorce, people
are standing in the world as single adults again, and many will find it difficult
to develop a new pattern of recreation and social participation. Studies
generally show less social participation after divorce and a shrinkage of the
social network (Milardo 1987).
Some divorced persons will be more socially integrated than others. Such
differences may arise for several reasons. Some divorced persons may already
have been less socially dependent on the spouse when they were married, some
will be in a better structural position to develop a new lifestyle after divorce,
and some will have a more sociable personality that makes it easier for them
to join clubs or seek out new activities (Gerstel 1988; Wallerstein & Blakeslee
1989). Whatever the reasons, we think that the degree to which a person is
socially integrated has an important effect on repartnering, because the level
of social integration is a fundamental prerequisite for meeting and mating with
new partners. New partners are often found directly, through leisure activities
such as those associated with bars, clubs, and voluntary associations, or they
are found indirectly, through one’s social network (Kalmijn & Flap 2001;
Laumann et al. 1994). We therefore expect that persons who are active in their
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leisure will be more likely to repartner than others and that persons who have
large social networks will be more likely to repartner than others.
The role of social integration in the repartnering process can be examined
more directly by considering the types of places where people met their new
partner. We distinguish three contexts in the remarriage market: work, leisure
activities, and social networks. Using this distinction, we can relate the type of
social integration to the corresponding type of meeting context. More
specifically, we expect that the effect of active leisure participation is stronger
on the risk of finding a new partner through leisure activities and weaker on
the risk of finding a new partner in other ways. Similarly, we expect that the
effect of integration in social networks is stronger on the risk of finding a new
partner through one’s social network and weaker on the risk of finding a new
partner in other ways. If these two additional hypotheses are confirmed,
stronger evidence will be obtained for our interpretation of the effects of these
variables on marriage market opportunities. If these hypotheses are not
confirmed, and if effects of leisure activities and social integration are present
for all meeting places, we could interpret such a result by arguing that these
variables are indicators of sociability. People who are socially active apparently
are more at ease in all social settings and will have better skills to interact with
others. This sociability may help them to find a new partner in all kinds of
meeting places.
Another important restriction on social integration is having children.
Children are generally believed to reduce remarriage prospects. One reason is
that people with children might go out less often, especially when the children
are still young, which will reduce people’s opportunities to meet and mate
(Wallerstein & Blakeslee 1989). Children may also affect repartnering in other
ways. Divorced persons without children often still want to have children and
will therefore have a greater need for a new partner (Lampard & Peggs 1999).
In addition, new potential partners may be less interested in marrying someone
who already has children, either because prior children can serve as a source
of conflict or friction in the new relationship or because such a person is less
likely to want to have additional children. Thus, not only a lack of social
integration but also needs and attractiveness play a role in the effect of
children.
We have two ways of examining whether the argument about marriage
market opportunities is involved in the effect of children. First, one would
expect an effect of children on remarriage that is conditional on where the
children are living. More specifically, we expect that children living at home
reduce repartnering chances more than children living with the former spouse
or elsewhere. This hypothesis applies to both men and women. Note that even
though it is mostly women who gain custody after divorce, there are enough
divorced men with children at home in the sample to assess whether the
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hypothesis is valid for men. A second implication of the opportunity argument
lies in the type of meeting context. Because children at home primarily restrict
activities out of the home, children (at home) should have a stronger negative
effect on the risk of finding a partner through work and leisure activities than
on the risk of finding a partner through other channels, such as the
neighborhood or one’s social network. If the effects are similar for the various
meeting contexts, the effect of children on repartnering will have more to do
with reduced needs and attractiveness than with limited meeting
opportunities.
HYPOTHESES ABOUT ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS
Our second group of hypotheses is inspired by economic theories of marriage.
We first consider the economic characteristics of the marriage that was broken.
We generally expect that sex-role specialization during marriage will lead to a
higher probability of repartnering. Married women who have not invested time
in paid labor during marriage will have a weaker position in the labor market
after divorce. These women will be less independent financially and thus have
a stronger financial need to repartner (Becker, Landes & Michael 1977; Mott &
Moore 1983; Sweeney 1997). Repartnering rates will therefore be higher when
women contributed less to the family income during marriage and when
women worked a smaller portion of the time they were married. Sex-role
specialization during marriage may also make men more dependent after
divorce. In general, married men tend to specialize in market labor and often
contribute little to household tasks and child-rearing. Because domestic labor
also requires skills, these men may feel less autonomous after divorce and
experience a greater need to repartner (Van Poppel 1995). We therefore expect
repartnering rates to be higher when men contributed less to household tasks
during marriage and when they need help in housekeeping when they live on
their own.
After divorce, economic conditions will also play a role. One consideration
is that women may enter or reenter the labor force when their marriages end.
Note that the employment rates of married women are low (de Graaf &
Vermeulen 1997). Less than 10% of married women with children have full-
time jobs, and more than 50% of them are not employed at all. Most married
women without children do have jobs, although even in the youngest cohorts
only 60% of them have full-time jobs. Divorced women may begin to work
again for several reasons. They may wish to improve their economic well-being,
or they may regard employment as a new source of social integration and
support after divorce. Whatever the reason, employment is likely to reduce a
woman’s financial needs, thereby weakening the desire to remarry (Becker,
Landes & Michael 1977; Mott & Moore 1983). While work increases women’s
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economic independence, women who do not work generally have alternative
sources of support, such as alimony payments, welfare, or several other kinds
of public income transfers. Because women who work, and in particular women
who work full-time, are generally doing better financially than other women,
we expect that repartnering rates are lower for women who work.
An alternative mechanism may be involved in the work effect as well,
because work organizations may function as a meeting place for new partners.
When divorced women work for pay, they will be more likely to meet potential
partners, and this may increase their repartnering chances. Hence, the
economic argument implies a negative effect of work on repartnering (“less
need”), while the social argument implies a positive effect (“more
opportunity”). To separate these effects, we develop an additional hypothesis
by looking at the place where women met their new partners. We expect that
when the work effect is primarily a matter of meeting opportunity, the effect
of work on repartnering should be positive when considering the risk of finding
a new partner through work and zero when considering the risk of finding a
new partner in other ways. The implication of this hypothesis is not so much
that employment increases the odds of finding a partner at work, which would
be trivial, but rather that employment has a stronger effect on finding a partner
at work than on finding a partner elsewhere. If the effect of work on finding a
new partner in other meeting places is also significant, this result would suggest
that working women are more attractive on the remarriage market and that it
is not the meeting opportunity argument that counts.
For men’s employment, the social and economic mechanisms work in
similar directions. Given the traditional male breadwinner model that still
exists to a large extent in the Netherlands (Van Berkel & de Graaf 1998), one
would expect that men who work for pay and men with high socioeconomic
status positions are more likely to repartner than other men. Such men are
probably more attractive in the remarriage market, and the gains to
specialization for them are higher than the benefits of living alone (Becker,
Landes & Michael 1977; Sweeney 1997). Meeting opportunities are involved
in the work effect as well, except that in this case, the implications of the two
theoretical arguments are the same. To separate the effects, we again develop
an additional hypothesis by looking at the meeting place. If the argument about
meeting opportunity is true, we would expect the work effect on repartnering
to be stronger when considering the risk of finding a new partner through work
than when considering the risk of finding a new partner in other ways. If only
the attractiveness argument is true, work effects should exist for all meeting
channels.
In the reasoning above, we are able to distinguish between interpretations
in terms of marriage market opportunities and interpretations in terms of
economic needs. The latter sort of interpretation, however, may be confounded
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by the fact that need and attractiveness are sometimes negatively correlated.
Independent persons (financially or domestically) may have less need to
repartner, but at the same time they may be more attractive than dependent
persons. The needs argument implies a positive effect of dependency on
repartnering, while the attractiveness argument implies a negative effect of
dependency on repartnering. We can separate out the role of meeting
opportunity, but we have to see empirically which of the remaining two
mechanisms (needs and attractiveness) is stronger.
Another economic hypothesis has to do with the type of income women
receive. Some divorced women receive welfare and alimony payments, and in
the Netherlands such payments are generally not portable to a new marriage.
Since women on welfare have fewer financial advantages from remarrying than
otherwise comparable women who are not on welfare (England & Farkas 1986;
Mott & Moore 1983), we expect that alimony and welfare reduce the chances
of remarrying. For most of the period we consider, welfare regulations did not
consider cohabitation as equivalent to marriage, and as a result, we also expect
the effect to depend on whether we look at cohabitation or remarriage. More
specifically, we expect that the effect of nonportable transfer payments is
stronger on remarriage than on cohabitation after divorce. For men, we expect
effects of alimony as well, but for different reasons. Because repartnering does
not end men’s obligation to pay alimony, men who are paying alimony may
find it more difficult to financially support a new family. Hence, we expect that
alimony payments on the part of men will reduce the chances of repartnering.
HYPOTHESES ABOUT CULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS
Our last set of hypotheses addresses the influence of cultural factors. Several
studies in the past have shown that late marriage, cohabitation, childlessness,
and divorce are more common among couples with less traditional values (e.g.,
Barber & Axinn 1998; Clarkberg, Stolzenberg & Waite 1995; Lehrer & Chiswick
1993; Liefbroer & de Jong Gierveld 1993; Thornton, Axinn & Hill 1992). We
distinguish between three important aspects of nontraditional values:
(1) emancipatory values (an orientation to egalitarian sex roles and women’s
independence), (2) individualistic values (an emphasis on autonomy and self-
actualization), and (3) religious values (involvement in church and religion).
It is generally argued that people with emancipatory, individualistic, and
nonreligious values are less supportive of the institution of marriage. Their
preference or “taste” for marriage is supposed to be weaker, or they simply do
not feel a moral obligation to marry.
In research on first marriage, values are generally considered to be relevant
only for the choice between marriage and cohabitation, because most people
eventually enter a relationship (Clarkberg, Stolzenberg & Waite 1995). When
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analyzing what happens after divorce, we expect to find effects of values on the
formation of new relationships themselves, not only on their legal form.
Influences of values on repartnering are not easy to assess, because values may
change over the life course, particularly in response to important life events
such as a divorce. One example is that women may become more progressive
or more radical in their attitudes toward sex roles and women’s issues because
they have had negative experiences in their former marriage (Ambert 1985).
Below, we formulate hypotheses for the three aspects of values discussed above.
First, we expect that persons with emancipatory values will be less likely to
repartner than others. We furthermore believe that this effect will be stronger
for remarriage than for cohabitation because emancipatory attitudes will
primarily reflect a rejection of the institution of marriage, and to a lesser extent
a rejection of living with someone of the opposite sex. Note that this hypothesis
applies especially to women, since married women do more work in the home
than their husbands and thus may have developed a stronger dislike of
marriage. Second, we expect that people with individualistic values are less
likely to repartner than others. We expect that this effect applies equally to
remarriage and cohabitation because individualistic values reflect a cautious
attitude toward all forms of long-term commitment to a relationship.
Third, we expect no effect of religious attitudes on repartnering. The reason
for this is that we think two opposing effects are operating. First, we believe
that religious persons will be more likely to remarry (vs. staying single) than
nonreligious persons, largely because for religious persons, marriage is the most
appropriate way of having a new intimate (sexual) relationship. A caveat here
is that in some denominations, especially in the Roman Catholic Church,
remarriage has long been disapproved of. Historical evidence for religious
effects on individuals’ remarriage behavior is negative, however (Van Poppel
1995), and it is therefore unlikely that such prescriptions will have much
leverage in modern times. Second, we think that religious persons are less likely
to recohabit (vs. staying single) than nonreligious persons, largely because
religious persons tend to reject unmarried cohabitation (Thornton, Axinn &
Hill 1992). In other words, religious divorced persons would rather stay single
than enter a new relationship when this would lead to unmarried cohabitation.
We thus expect a positive effect of religiosity on remarriage and a negative
effect on cohabitation, leading to a zero effect on repartnering in general.
Data, Models, and Findings
To test our hypotheses, we use data from the 1998 survey on divorce in the
Netherlands (Kalmijn, de Graaf & Uunk 2000). The sample for this survey was
drawn from 19 municipalities that are representative of the Dutch population
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with respect to region, urbanization, and political party preference. From the
population registers of these municipalities, three random samples were drawn:
(1) first-married persons, (2) divorced persons who were not remarried, and
(3) divorced persons who were remarried. Sample 2 includes persons who were
cohabiting at the time of the survey. In total, 2,346 people participated in the
survey. All respondents were interviewed at home using structured
questionnaires. Interviews lasted an average of 90 minutes. The cooperation
rate of the survey was 58%, and this rate was the same for the three marital
status groups (Kalmijn, de Graaf & Uunk 2000). For our analyses, we focus on
samples 2 and 3. We excluded people who remarried their former partner
(N = 14) and people with missing data on marriage and divorce dates (N = 5),
leaving 1,776 ever-divorced persons. The average person in the sample was in
his or her late thirties at the time of divorce, and about two-thirds of them
already had children. The divorces we analyze occurred between 1949 and
1997, with the average divorce occurring in the mid-1980s. Note that the year
of divorce is defined as the year in which the couple stopped living together.
The time between breaking up and the official divorce appears to be relatively
short, ten months on average. Note that in the descriptive part of the analyses,
we correct the oversample of 3 compared to 2 with weights based on data
published by Statistics Netherlands.
TABLE 2: Repartnering after Divorce by the Number of Years since the
Separation and the Year of the Separation
Cumulative % Year of Separation
Repartnereda Women Men
<1974 75-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 <1974 75-79 80-84 85-89 90-94
Year 5 38 32 36 31 38 55 50 49 50 48
Year 10 55 48 53 49 76 67 64 68
Year 15 61 54 62 80 77 74
Year 20 68 57 80 79
Year 25 70 83
Cohabitingb 33 49 37 41 47 33 42 44 43 54
N 134 119 195 212 259 76 82 142 138 178
a Percentages are based on the first relationship after divorce of the ever-divorced person.
b Based on the most recent observation for the relationship (the survey year or the year in which
the partners in the [second] relationship divorced).
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DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSES
Ever-divorced people were asked about all the married or cohabiting
relationships they had after their divorces. In this study, we focus on the first
union that people had after divorce, whether that union is still intact at the
time of the survey or not. In Table 2, we focus on the extent to which divorced
people repartner, married or not. We present the cumulative percentages of
people who have repartnered at selected time intervals since the year of divorce
(which is the year in which the couple split up, not the official divorce year).
These figures are presented for five divorce cohorts and for men and women
separately. In the first ten years after divorce, we observe that about 70% of
the men and 50% of the women repartnered. After 20 years, the cumulative
percentages have risen to 80% for men and over 60% for women. Of the
repartnered group, we have calculated which percentage was (eventually)
married. These figures show that in the oldest divorce cohort, about a third
was not married to the new partner. In the youngest cohort, about half the
repartnered group was not married, but this cohort has had less time to change
from cohabitation to marriage. Men and women do not differ much in how
often they cohabit after divorce. Our main conclusion from these results is that
cohabitation after divorce is quite common.
TABLE 3: Meeting Places of Partners in the First and the Second
Cohabiting Relationships of Repartnered Men and Women
Women Men
Second Second
First Marriage or First Marriage or
Marriage Cohabitationa Marriage Cohabitationa
At or through work 11.9 19.5 14.9 27.2
At or through school 8.9 3.3 9.5 2.1
Voluntary associations,
leisure activities 15.2 13.5 16.7 14.4
Public places (e.g., bars,
theaters, restaurants) 35.2 23.9 33.9 26.9
Through friends, family,
neighborhood 23.8 25.9 20.2 21.0
Personal ad, organized
intermediaries .5 7.6 .3 3.9
Other ways 4.6 6.3 4.5 4.5
Total 100 100 100 100
N 395 394 336 334
a Based on the current relationship of ever-divorced persons.
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An important consideration in our hypotheses about repartnering lies in
the opportunities to find a new spouse. We have argued, as others have done,
that the remarriage market is not only smaller but also less efficient than the
market for people who are young and single. To give a first impression of how
the remarriage market works, we present data on where the repartnered
couples met. The distribution of the meeting places does not completely
coincide with the opportunity structure of the second marriage market, but it
gives an interesting impression, especially in the comparison between the
meeting places of the repartnered couples and where the same respondents
met their first partner (Table 3). Of the repartnered men, 27% met their new
spouses at work, 27% met them in a public place (such as a bar, a restaurant,
or a theater), 14% met them in a voluntary association or through leisure
activities, and 21% through informal contacts with the social network (friends,
family, the neighborhood). Figures for repartnered women are similar, although
work is less important (20%). More important, however, is the comparison
between first and second unions. We see a clear shift from school to work:
schools are important contexts for first marriages but unimportant for second
relationships, while workplaces are important contexts for second marriages
but less for first. We also observe that public places are less important for second
relationships, which is consistent with the notion that divorced persons are
generally less actively integrated into society.
Perhaps the most telling (though not necessarily most convincing) evidence
that the remarriage market is more difficult can be found in the use of personal
ads and organized intermediaries. About 4% of the men and 8% of the women
met their new spouses this way. The comparable figures for the first spouse are
trifling. Because these numbers apply to relationships that were actually
formed, we also asked divorced persons (remarried or not) whether they ever
placed an ad or contacted an intermediary to find a spouse. About 13% of ever-
divorced persons had done so after the divorce, and about 11% ever went to
meetings specifically designed to meet other single men or women.
MODELS
To examine the social, economic, and cultural determinants of repartnering,
we use discrete-time event-history analysis (Yamaguchi 1991). Discrete-time
models are good approximations of continuous time models as long as the time
intervals are not too large. We use years as our interval. Duration dependency
is assessed by using the natural logarithm of the number of years since the
divorce. This takes into account that the remarriage rate rises particularly fast
in the early years after divorce and slows down afterward.
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We estimate three event-history models, for women and men separately.
Model A is a discrete-time event-history model in which the dependent
variable is the probability of repartnering in a given year, conditional on
whether one is still single in the year before.
Model B is a competing-risk model that takes the legal form into account.
The dependent variables are (1) the conditional probability of marrying after
divorce versus staying single, and (2) the conditional probability of cohabiting
after divorce versus staying single. For both dependent variables, the other type
of repartnering is treated as a competing risk (Allison 1982). We abstain from
analyzing transitions from cohabitation to marriage, but we include transitions
to marriage that occurred within the first year. More specifically, if a person
was married directly or if the person was married within the first year, we define
the event as remarried; otherwise the event is defined as recohabitation. A
similar approach was used earlier for first union formation by Liefbroer (1991).
Note that if the first union after divorce was already dissolved at the time of
the interview and if that union was a marriage, we do not know whether that
marriage was preceded by cohabitation. This is the case for 29 respondents. In
these cases, we treated the person as married directly, which does not seem
unreasonable.
Model C is a second competing-risk model that takes the meeting context
into account. The dependent variables are (1) the conditional probability of
finding a partner at or through work, versus staying single; (2) the conditional
probability of finding a partner through leisure activities, voluntary associations,
and public places (including school, but this is a small number), versus staying
single; and (3) the conditional probability of finding a partner in other ways,
mostly through one’s own network, versus staying single.
To estimate the models, we construct a person-year file that contains records
for each individual for each year, beginning in the year after the year in which
the couple stopped living together and ending in the year in which the person
first started living together with someone again or the year of the survey, in
case the person had remained single the whole time. Model A is estimated with
a logistic regression model for the probability of repartnering, conditional on
still being single the year before. The competing-risk models B and C are
estimated by applying multinomial logistic regression to the person-period file
(Allison 1982). The contrast chosen in all cases is between the event and the
nonevent, leaving out the competing event. To obtain a parsimonious
presentation of these models, we used constraints across equations (using
Stata). More specifically, if we did not formulate a risk-specific hypothesis for
a certain variable, we constrained the effects of this variable to be equal across
equations. We made an exception for the year of divorce and for duration
because historical trends and duration dependency may be different for the
different risks.
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TABLE 4: Definition and Means of Independent Variablesa
Mean Mean
Variable and Definition Time Period Range Men Women
Control variables
Year of separation — 49-98 85 89
Duration of prior marriage Prior marriage 0-46 12 13
Current age Dynamic 17-84 37 36
Years of schooling completed Prior marriage 8-20 14 13
Social-integration variables
Index of leisure activity
(3 items) First year after divorce 0-3 2.06 1.85
Attending church First year after divorce 0-1 .22 .23
Index of social contacts
(4 items) First year after divorce 0-4 1.84 2.05
One or more children at home Dynamic 0-1 .16 .62
All children not at home Dynamic 0-1 .50 .13
Economic variables
Proportion of marriage wife
was employed Prior marriage 0-1 — .52
Female contribution to
household income Prior marriage 1-5 — 2.01
Index of male contribution
to housekeeping (3 items) Prior marriage 0-3 1.20 —
Working full-time
(30+ hours per week) Dynamic 0-1 — .36
Working part-time
(1-29 hours per week) Dynamic 0-1 — .20
Working in the labor force Dynamic 0-1 .89 —
Occupational prestige of
current job Dynamic 13-87 48 —
Receiving welfare payments Dynamic 0-1 — .19
Receiving alimony payments
for personal expenses Dynamic 0-1 — .10
Paying alimony payments
for wife or children Dynamic 0-1 .18 —
Index of financial troubles
(4 items) First year after divorce 0-4 — 1.01
Index of dependency on
housekeeping help (3 items) First year after divorce 0-3 .83 —
Cultural variables
Emancipatory activity First year after divorce 0-1 .04 .08
Individualistic activity First year after divorce 0-1 .08 .12
Member of church Dynamic 0-1 .42 .42
Number of cases 614 968
a See text for details. For dynamic variables, the means refer to the first year after the separation
year. In regression analyses, all dynamic independent variables are lagged one calendar year.
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A complication in the study of remarriage is that in some cases a new
partner may have been the cause of the divorce. In these cases the causal order
is unclear and many of the characteristics we have suggested as determinants
of remarriage will probably be less relevant. Although it is difficult to identify
such persons, we think the following two conditions are a reasonable
approximation: persons who divorced and repartnered in the same calendar
year, and persons who repartnered in the calendar year after the divorce year
and also reported that another relationship was a reason for their divorce. These
persons were excluded, leaving a total of 1,582 ever-divorced persons for our
event-history models.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
For some independent variables we have information for all points in time; for
other characteristics we have information about only some periods, such as the
first five years of the first marriage or the first year after the divorce. Some
concepts are measured differently for men and for women. Means and standard
deviations are presented in Table 4.
Social Integration
To measure leisure activities, we asked how often the respondent was involved
in the following four types of activity in the first year after the divorce:
(1) participation in sports, hobbies, and voluntary associations, (2) going out
to a restaurant, bar, or theater, (3) participating in recreational activities, such
as hiking or visiting a show or attraction, and (4) attending church. The index
is the number of times the respondent reported being active “sometimes” or
“often.” Church attendance is kept as a separate item because we consider it
in combination with church membership (see below). We also developed a
measure of social contact in the first year after the divorce. This measure is a
count of the following items: (1) weekly contact with good friends, (2) weekly
contact with family members, (3) at least monthly contact with neighbors, and
(4) at least monthly contact with colleagues outside the immediate work
context. We amplify our social measures by considering information on
children. We first make a distinction between couples who had children from
the first marriage and couples who did not. For couples who had children, we
subsequently made a distinction between a situation in which one or more
children were living at home and a situation where all children were living
elsewhere (either with the former spouse or on their own).
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Economic Variables for Women
We consider economic characteristics of the prior marriage as well as economic
conditions after divorce. Using a full work-history module, we construct a
variable measuring the proportion of years of the marriage in which the wife
was employed. In addition, we used a more subjective approach by asking to
what extent the wife contributed to the family income in the first years of the
marriage (using a five-point scale, ranging from 1 for “nothing at all” to 5 for
“virtually everything”). Economic conditions after divorce were assessed by a
set of time-varying covariates: (1) whether the woman was working part-time
or full-time (we will test whether part-time work has a different effect from
full-time work), (2) whether she was receiving welfare payments, and
(3) whether she was receiving alimony payments (for her own expenses, not
for the children). Note that all these variables are time-varying. To measure
financial needs more directly, we asked questions about the financial situation
in the first year after the divorce: (1) whether the respondent had ever had
troubles making ends meet, (2) whether she has had difficulty replacing broken
equipment, (3) whether she had ever been late with paying the rent or
mortgage, and (4) whether she has ever had experience with bailiffs. The
number of positive responses is used as an index of financial problems after
divorce.
Economic Variables for Men
We use the following three variables to characterize men’s economic situation
after divorce: (1) whether the respondent was working in the labor force, (2) the
occupational prestige of his job (Sixma & Ultee 1984), and (3) whether he was
paying alimony in the given year. These variables are time-varying. For men
who did not work in the given year, we assigned the mean prestige of all men
in that year. This means that the work effect captures the difference between
nonworking men and working men with an average occupational prestige in
that year. Two scales indicate men’s domestic dependency after divorce. We first
asked how the following three household tasks were divided in the first years
of the marriage: (1) cooking, (2) doing the laundry, and (3) cleaning. The
number of tasks to which the husband contributed at least as much as the wife
is used as a scale. Second, we asked to what extent the respondent was helped
by family members, paid housekeepers, or acquaintances in doing the following
three tasks during the first year after the divorce: (1) cooking, (2) doing the
laundry, and (3) cleaning. The index is the number of times the husband
reported being helped “sometimes” or “often.” Note that the list of potential
helpers does not include the (possible) remarriage partner.
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Cultural Variables
Attitudes are difficult to measure in a retrospective fashion because life-course
experiences may change a person’s perception of his or her earlier attitudes.
Because our data are retrospective, we use measures of concrete activities in
the past that reflect progressive attitudes among men and women. We believe
that reports about activities in the past will not be biased as much as reports
about prior attitudes. Such measures are an improvement over previous work
in which cultural measurement is typically limited to a global distinction
between Catholics and others (see Table 1). Emancipatory activities are
measured by a question of whether the respondent attended meetings about
women’s liberation or the women’s movement in the first year after the divorce
(“sometimes” or “often”). Although the proportions of respondents who
attended such meetings are rather low (4% of the men and 8% of the women),
we expect that this measure will test the validity of our hypothesis that
egalitarian values lead to a dislike of the marriage institution. Individualistic
activities are measured by a question of whether the respondent attended
meetings about self-actualization, meditation, or new age in the first year after
the divorce (“sometimes” or “often”). Religiosity is measured by a question on
church membership in the first year after the divorce. The effect of church
membership is controlled for church attendance, measured for the same year,
so that it primarily captures the normative or ideological aspect of religion and,
to a lesser extent, the social aspect of religion. Similarly, church attendance
controlling for church membership will capture the social aspect of religion
more than the normative aspect. The two items have a positive correlation, but
not prohibitively strong (r = .47).
Control Variables
We include the following control variables in the analyses: the year in which
the couple divorced, the time elapsed since the divorce (logged), the duration
of the prior marriage, the respondent’s current age, and the level of completed
education (recoded to the number of formally required years of schooling).
Note that education can in part be interpreted as an economic variable.
We have to keep in mind that our data are retrospective. It is sometimes
argued that individual survey reports about the past are affected by subsequent
life events. The experience of divorce, for example, could lead to a more negative
view of the marriage; similarly, those who remain married may forget the bad
things that happened during their marriage. There are several reasons why, in
the present context, we think such biases are limited. For all concepts, we use
questions about concrete behaviors rather than about feelings or attitudes, and
for most concepts, we use multiple items. There will obviously still be
measurement error, but the question is whether the error is systematic. To make
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a claim of systematic error, one must show that remarried people are more
negative or more positive about their past behaviors than people who did not
remarry. We think such an effect is not very plausible, and we therefore believe
that most of the error that does exist will be random. Random error mostly
reduces the size and significance of regression coefficients, and so these
problems will generally not lead to false positive conclusions.
REGRESSION RESULTS
The models are presented in Table 5 for women and in Table 6 for men. We
begin by discussing the effects of the control variables. The number of years
since the separation reveals a positive slope for men and for women, showing
that the conditional remarriage chances tend to increase, particularly in the
early years after divorce. The coefficient for the year of separation can be
interpreted as the trend in remarriage, net of compositional changes in the
divorce cohorts with respect to the other measured characteristics that affect
remarriage. Table 6 shows that there is no significant change in repartnering
for men. When we look at the competing-risk model, we see that the lack of
change in repartnering in fact consists of underlying opposing trends in
marriage and cohabitation after divorce. There has been a significant downward
trend in remarriage over the years, while recohabitation has increased across
cohorts. Apparently, the two trends cancel each other completely. For women,
the pattern is different, as Table 5 shows. We see no downward trend in
remarriage, but we do see an increase in cohabitation. Together, these effects
lead to an overall increase in repartnering for women. When comparing
changes for men and women, we may conclude that women, who traditionally
have had a much lower repartnering rate, have been narrowing the gap.
The historical pattern just discussed is the same when we use a model that
contains only the year of separation, duration, and (current) age — that is,
without the other variables. Trends that were significant in the full model
remain significant in the stripped model, although the coefficients tend to be
somewhat larger.
Duration of marriage has a positive effect on repartnering, showing that
people who have been married longer are more likely to repartner after divorce.
This applies to both men and women. In addition, we use current age as a
(dynamic) control variable. We think that current age is a more appropriate
measure to assess age effects than the age at divorce, which is usually included
in remarriage models (e.g., Smock 1990). However this may be, our conclusion
is similar to what other studies find: a strong negative effect of age on
repartnering. The effect is observed for both men and women, but it is stronger
for women. Educational level is included as a control variable as well, although
we note that education does have both economic and cultural interpretations.
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The effects of education are differentiated by sex. For women we find no effect,
and for men we find a positive effect: the higher the level of education, the
greater the chances that men find a new partner after divorce.
TABLE 5: Repartnering of Divorced Women: Event-History Analysis of
Repartnering, Competing-Risk Analysis of Remarriage and
Recohabitation, and Competing-Risk Analysis of Meeting Setting
Model A Model B
Women Repartnering Marriage Cohabitation
Time variables
Log of duration since separation .934** .927** .942**
Year of separation .020** .005 .030**
Control variables
Duration of marriage .121** .121** #
Current age –.180** –.180** #
Education .004 .004 #
Social-integration factors
Participation in leisure activities .139** .141** #
Church attendance .273* .269* #
Social contacts .015 .015 #
Children at home –.332** –.330** #
Children not at home .059 .061 #
Economic characteristics
Labor-force experience .014 .010 #
Contribution to marriage income .032 .033 #
Working part- or full-time .172 .172 #
Financial troubles –.023 –.022 #
Receives welfare –.294* –.615** –.133
Receives alimony –.380* –.776* –.224
Cultural characteristics
Emancipatory activities –.030 –.180 .043
Individualistic activities –.417** –1.230** –.154
Church membership –.133 .103 –.262*
Miscellaneous parameters
Number of women 968 968
Number of person-years 9,051 9,051
Number of events 468 167 301
2 of all coefficients (df) 372 (19) 394 (26)
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TABLE 5: Repartnering of Divorced Women: Event-History Analysis of
Repartnering, Competing-Risk Analysis of Remarriage and
Recohabitation, and Competing-Risk Analysis of Meeting Setting
(Continued)
Model C
Women Via Work Via Leisure In Other Ways
Time variables
Log of duration since separation .970** .956** .950**
Year of separation .004 .044** .011
Control variables
Duration of marriage .122** # #
Current age –.181** # #
Education .004 # #
Social-integration factors
Participation in leisure activities .092 .202* .113
Church attendance –.093 .327* .341*
Social contacts –.093 .048 .027
Children at home –.859** –.387* –.091
Children not at home –.020 –.287 .345
Economic characteristics
Labor-force experience .012 # #
Contribution to marriage income .031 # #
Working part- or full-time .953** .216 –.051
Financial troubles –.022 # #
Receives welfare –.293* # #
Receives alimony –.384* # #
Cultural characteristics
Emancipatory activities –.026 # #
Individualistic activities –.418** # #
Church membership –.133 # #
Miscellaneous parameters
Number of women 968
Number of person-years 9,051
Number of events 77 160 231
2 of all coefficients (df) 410 (35)
Note: In the equation of Model B for remarriage versus single, cohabitation is treated as a compet-
ing risk; in the equation for cohabitation versus single, remarriage is treated as a competing risk.
Model C presents the odds of finding a spouse in the specified fashion versus staying single, with
the other meeting channels as competing risks. All models are estimated in Stata.
# Coefficient constrained to be equal across equations within multinomial logit model.
* p < .05      ** p < .01   (one-tailed tests)
1486 / Social Forces  81:4, June 2003
FINDINGS FOR THE HYPOTHESES ABOUT SOCIAL-INTEGRATION CHARACTERISTICS
Starting with the results for women in Table 5, we observe that the number of
social contacts does not affect repartnering probabilities. We do, however,
observe a strong and significant effect of participation in leisure activities. The
more activities divorced women have outside the home, the larger their
TABLE 6: Repartnering of Divorced Men: Event-History Analysis of
Repartnering, Competing-Risk Analysis of Remarriage and
Recohabitation, and Competing-Risk Analysis of Meeting Setting
Model A Model B
Men Repartnering Marriage Cohabitation
Time variables
Log of duration since separation .669** .484** .785**
Year of separation –.000 –.028** .018*
Control variables
Duration of marriage .083** .084** #
Current age –.126** –.126** #
Education .051** .051** #
Social-integration factors
Participation in leisure activities –.133* –.130* #
Church attendance .389** .381* #
Social contacts .041 .042 #
Children at home –.886** –.885** #
Children not at home –.398** –.399** #
Economic characteristics
Contribution to household labor –.029 –.027 #
Need of household assistance .140** .138** #
Working .482** .479** #
Occupational prestige .001 .001 #
Paying alimony .033 .022 #
Cultural characteristics
Emancipatory activities –.138 –.135 –.135
Individualistic activities –.387* –.316 –.425
Church membership –.282* .160 –.526**
Miscellaneous parameters
Number of men 614 614
Number of person-years 4,502 4,502
Number of events 374 130 244
2 all coefficients (df) 242 (18) 265 (23)
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TABLE 6: Repartnering of Divorced Men: Event-History Analysis of
Repartnering, Competing-Risk Analysis of Remarriage and
Recohabitation, and Competing-Risk Analysis of Meeting Setting
(Continued)
Model C
Men Via Work Via Leisure In Other Ways
Time variables
Log of duration since separation .684** .670** .662**
Year of separation –.009 .016 –.010
Control variables
Duration of marriage .083** # #
Current age –.126** # #
Education .051** # #
Social-integration factors
Participation in leisure activities –.107 –.035 –.239**
Church attendance .150 .648** .231
Social contacts .040 .060 .020
Children at home –.863* –1.172** –.595*
Children not at home –.462* –.540** –.191
Economic characteristics
Contribution to household labor –.030 # #
Need of household assistance .141** # #
Working .883** .339 .411
Occupational prestige .001 # #
Paying alimony .033 # #
Cultural characteristics
Emancipatory activities –.140 # #
Individualistic activities –.382* # #
Church membership –.283* # #
Miscellaneous parameters
Number of men 614
Number of person-years 4,502
Number of events 91 145 138
2 of all coefficients (df) 258 (34)
Note: In the equation of Model B for remarriage versus single, cohabitation is treated as a compet-
ing risk; in the equation for cohabitation versus single, remarriage is treated as a competing risk.
Model C presents the odds of finding a spouse in the specified fashion versus staying single, with
the other meeting channels as competing risks. All models are estimated in Stata.
# Coefficient constrained to be equal across equations within multinomial logit model.
* p < .05      ** p < .01   (one-tailed tests)
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repartnering probability. In addition, we find that divorced women who attend
church more often are also significantly more likely to repartner. Note that the
effect of church attendance is controlled for the effect of church membership,
so that it is not plausible to interpret the effect of church attendance in terms
of religiosity only. The effect of these two variables can also be modeled in a
different way, by comparing three groups: church members who attend church
regularly (active members), church members who do not attend church
(passive members), and nonmembers. If we consider these dummy variables,
we observe that the contrast between active and passive church members is
statistically significant. This supports our interpretation in terms of social
integration in a different way. Apparently, it is the social integration produced
by church attendance that increases the likelihood to repartner and not so
much the religious values.
The effects discussed above are positive evidence for our hypothesis about
marriage market opportunities. Divorced women who are better integrated
socially have better chances of meeting a new partner, which is why they are
more likely to repartner. Further evidence is obtained from the competing-
risk model in which the type of meeting setting is incorporated (model C). If
the effect of leisure activities is equally strong in the three equations, the
interpretation of the leisure effect would lie primarily in sociability or some
other unmeasured individual trait. If the effect of leisure is strongest for the
risk of repartnering via leisure, interpretations in terms of social integration
are more plausible. The competing-risk model C shows that the effect of
participation in leisure activities is significant for the risk of finding a new
partner through activities outside the home and voluntary associations and not
significant for the risk of finding a new partner via work or in other ways. This
underscores our interpretation of this effect on repartnering in terms of
meeting opportunities and appears to contradict interpretations in terms of
sociability. For the effect of church attendance we also observe differential
effects in the competing-risk model. Church attendance has no effect on
repartnering via work and positive and significant effects on repartnering via
leisure activities and on repartnering in other ways. Since finding a partner
through church (or church-related institutions) is included in the leisure
category, we should have found an effect only on repartnering through leisure.
That there is also an effect on repartnering in other ways is less consistent with
the social interpretation of the church effect.
For men (Table 6), again we find no effect of social contacts on repartnering.
We do find an effect of church attendance, however. Divorced men who attend
church more often are more likely to repartner. Inconsistent with our
hypothesis, and in contrast to what we found for women, is the effect of leisure
activities on repartnering. Divorced men who are active and often go to bars
or restaurants in their spare time are significantly less likely to remarry than
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other divorced men. It is not clear how to interpret this effect, but perhaps it
is associated with a certain lifestyle that is incompatible with the stability that
a new marriage often brings. The analysis of meeting contexts for men is
consistent with our hypotheses. More specifically, we find that the effect of
church attendance is significant for repartnering only via leisure activities. This
is positive support for the social-integration hypothesis, since we expected an
effect on repartnering through leisure activities only.
Another important aspect of marriage market opportunities has to do with
children. We find that children affect repartnering, though in a differentiated
fashion. For both men and women, we find strong negative effects of having
children at home on repartnering. For men, however, we also find a negative
effect of nonresident children, while for women, only resident children seem
to affect repartnering. For both men and women, children at home have a
larger effect than children who are living elsewhere. The chi-square test for
the equality of these two effects is 6.2 for women (p ≤ .01) and 6.1 for men
(p ≤ .01), which supports the hypothesis about marriage market opportunity.
Note that the effect of resident children is more negative for men than for
women, which may have to do with the fact that divorced men who have
children living at home are a more select group than divorced women with
children at home.
That the effect of children is a matter of meeting opportunities can also be
seen in competing-risk model C. For women, we find that having children at
home reduces the risk of finding a new partner at work as well as the risk of
finding one through activities outside the home and voluntary associations. It
does not, however, significantly reduce the risk of finding a partner in other
ways, of which the neighborhood and one’s own social network are the most
important. This pattern of effects shows that preferences and attractiveness are
not the main ways that children reduce women’s repartnering chances. For
men we find a similar pattern, but less convincing. The effect of children on
meeting a spouse through other channels, although weaker, is still statistically
significant.
FINDINGS FOR THE HYPOTHESES ABOUT WOMEN’S ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS
Hypotheses about sex-role specialization during the first marriage do not, in
general, receive much support. We expected that men and women from
traditional marriages — marriages in which husbands and wives develop
different but complementary skills — would be less able to live on their own
and would therefore repartner more often than others. The results in Table 5
show that women who contributed little to the family income during marriage
and women who did not accumulate labor-market experience when married
are not more likely to repartner than other women. These findings are
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inconsistent with economic theories of marriage. After all, in a traditional
remarriage market, economically dependent women have a greater need to
repartner than others and there would be traditional men willing to provide
them with economic support. If the remarriage market is less traditional, one
could argue that a greater degree of economic dependency also makes women
less attractive in the eyes of men. Under these conditions, need and
attractiveness would work in opposite directions.
Women’s socioeconomic conditions after divorce do affect repartnering
probabilities, but not in the way economic theory predicts. First, we find no
effect of our scale of financial problems after divorce on women’s repartnering
rate. Women who have more trouble making ends meet are not more likely to
repartner, as would be expected from the needs argument. Here, too, there is
the possibility that women with financial difficulties are less attractive, at least
to nontraditional men.
Second, women’s participation in the labor force has a moderate positive
effect on repartnering rates, but the effect is statistically not significant (p = .08).
Additional testing shows that when we replace the work variable with two
dummy variables for part-time and full-time work, their effects are not
significantly different (the chi-square test for equality is 2.2; p = .14). When
we look at the competing-risk model for the different means of meeting a
spouse (Table 5, model C), it becomes clear that the insignificant effect of labor-
force participation is brought about by opposite effects in different settings. The
effect of labor-force participation is strong and statistically significant on the
risk of finding a partner at work, but it is not significant in the equation for
meeting a spouse via leisure or in the equation for meeting a spouse in other
ways. If the work effect has a financial interpretation, labor-force participation
should also affect repartnering for these two nonwork settings. That the effect
is absent in these two equations supports the social interpretation and
contradicts the financial interpretation of labor-force participation.
The third socioeconomic hypothesis concerns income from welfare and
alimony. The effects of welfare and alimony provide the only piece of evidence
in favor of economic arguments. Women who receive alimony and women who
receive welfare are significantly less likely to repartner than women who do
not receive such payments. Note that the effect of work is in the model, too,
and hence we are comparing women on welfare to women with other, nonwork
income, like sickness or unemployment benefits. When looking at the effects
of work and welfare in combination, we may conclude that working women
have the highest repartnering rate and women on welfare the lowest, and
women with other income sources are in between.
The competing-risk model of marriage and cohabitation provides further
evidence for the hypothesis that nonportable income reduces the desire to
repartner. The effects of welfare and alimony exist only in the remarriage
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equation, not in the recohabitation equation. Women with welfare or alimony
payments are less likely to remarry but not less likely to recohabit. In most of
the period we consider, cohabitation was officially not recognized as marriage,
so that welfare and alimony payments were portable to a new relationship only
if one remained unmarried. Hence, welfare and alimony should affect
remarriage but not recohabitation, which is the pattern we find.
FINDINGS FOR THE HYPOTHESES ABOUT MEN’S ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS
The evidence for economic theories is not favorable in the case of men either
(Table 6). When men work for pay, they are significantly more likely to
repartner. That work has a positive effect on repartnering is consistent with
economic hypotheses about men’s attractiveness in a traditional marriage
market, but it is also consistent with hypotheses about opportunities to meet
and mate. To assess whether this effect has a social or economic interpretation,
we again analyze the different meeting contexts. Competing-risk model C shows
that the effect of work is statistically significant for the risk of finding a partner
through work. The work effect is not significant for the risk of finding a partner
via leisure or for the risk of finding a partner in other ways. In combination,
these effects support the hypothesis that work increases repartnering primarily
because work provides a setting that favors meeting and mating with potential
new partners. That work does not increase repartnering outside the work
context suggests that greater attractiveness on the part of working men is not
the reason that working men repartner more often.
The finding for the other status indicator for men further contradicts the
notion of attractiveness. The prestige of men’s current job has no significant
effect on repartnering. It is interesting that prestige has no effect while
education had a positive effect. If favorable economic prospects make men
attractive to new partners, we would expect repartnering to be dependent more
on their current status position than on their education. That only education
has an effect, and not occupational prestige, suggests that perhaps an
interpretation in terms of social integration is more appropriate. Studies
generally show that the better educated participate more often in a variety of
leisure pursuits, they vote more often, and they more often are active members
of voluntary associations (e.g., Curtis, Grabb & Baer 1992).
To test our economic hypothesis, we examine not only effects of paid labor,
but also effects of household labor. Our hypothesis is that divorced men with
poor domestic skills are more in need of a new partner than other, otherwise
comparable, men. In Table 6, we find no effect of the degree to which husbands
participated in household labor in the first marriage on their repartnering
chances after divorce. We do find, however, that divorced men who receive
household support in the first year after divorce are significantly more likely
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to repartner. This latter finding is consistent with our hypothesis about male
domestic dependency. Due to variations in domestic abilities, some men are
more in need of a new spouse than others, and this translates into a higher
rate of repartnering.
Finally, we find no effect of paying alimony. Men who have financial
obligations to their former wives or their children are not less likely to
repartner, in contrast to what economic hypotheses would argue. We also tested
whether the amount of alimony payments had an effect, but this did not turn
out to be the case either. This again shows that financial conditions do not affect
repartnering.
FINDINGS FOR THE HYPOTHESES ABOUT CULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS
How do norms and values affect men and women’s repartnering rates? We made
a distinction between three types of values: emancipatory, individualistic, and
religious. Because values are difficult to measure in a retrospective design, we
instead focus on three types of activities in the past that are presumably highly
correlated with such values: whether the respondent attended meetings about
women’s liberation and the women’s movement (emancipatory activities),
whether the respondent attended meetings about self-actualization,
meditation, or new age (individualistic activities), and church membership. All
three indicators are included in the event-history model, and we allowed them
to have differential effects in competing-risk model B, where a distinction is
made between marriage and cohabitation.
In contrast to what we expected, we find that an emancipatory orientation
among women is not associated with a lower repartnering rate. The competing-
risk analysis further shows that neither is there a significant effect when we look
at remarriage only. For men, we come to the same conclusion, although we note
that few divorced men were involved in emancipatory activities.
Individualistic activities in the past do have a negative effect on women’s
risk of repartnering, in line with what we hypothesized. The competing-risk
model provides an important additional result. Individualistic values have a
negative effect only on women’s rate of remarriage, not on their rate of
recohabitation. Hence, for divorced women, individualistic attitudes primarily
reflect a rejection of marriage, not a wish to be single after divorce. It thus does
not seem plausible that the effect of individualistic activities reflects a rejection
of long-term relationship involvement. More likely, it reflects a negative attitude
toward traditional institutions in general, of which marriage is considered an
important example. The results for men are closer to the notion of
individualism. Men who were involved in individualistic activities after divorce
are significantly less likely to repartner, and this effect shows up in both the
marriage and the cohabitation equation.
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Effects of religiosity are partly consistent with our hypothesis. For men and
for women, we find a negative effect of church membership on the rate of
repartnering. These effects are weak, however, and not significant for women.
The competing-risk analyses show that the negative effect is present only for
cohabitation after divorce, not for remarriage. This negative effect is stronger
for men than for women, but in both cases it is significant. While this is
consistent with our expectations, we also hypothesized a positive effect of
religion on remarriage, and this effect we do not find. Religious men and women
are not more likely to remarry than others. Religiosity primarily leads to a
rejection of (re)cohabitation and it is for that reason that they repartner less
often.
Discussion and Conclusion
Our study of repartnering has tried to improve upon previous research in a
number of ways. We have developed more extensive and more direct measures
of economic characteristics, we have introduced social and cultural hypotheses
and measures to the model, we have distinguished remarriage and cohabitation
after divorce, and we have incorporated the meeting settings in the model. With
these improvements, we have tried to gain a better understanding of the causes
of repartnering in Western society, using a newly conducted survey of ever-
divorced persons in the Netherlands as a test case.
We tested three sorts of arguments about the causes of remarriage:
economic theories, cultural theories, and social theories. Economic theories of
marriage receive little support. Our analyses show that men and women from
marriages characterized by high levels of sex-role specialization are not more
likely to repartner. In addition, poor socioeconomic prospects on the part of
divorced women do not lead to a higher repartnering rate. Women’s labor-force
participation does not have a negative effect on repartnering either, and women
on welfare — usually women with the greatest financial needs — are even less
likely to repartner. Although employed men are more likely to repartner than
unemployed men, this effect shows up only for repartnering via work, suggesting
that is not the financial dimension of employment that explains its effect on
repartnering. The only positive evidence for economic notions of specialization
is that men who are domestically dependent are more likely to repartner.
Cultural theories of remarriage are somewhat more important. Women with
an individualistic orientation are less likely to repartner. Competing-risk
models for the choice between marriage and cohabitation after divorce show
that these attitudes primarily reflect a rejection of marriage after divorce, not
a rejection of cohabitation. In addition, we find a differentiated effect of
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religiosity: religious persons are not more or less likely to remarry, but they are
clearly less likely to cohabit after divorce.
Stronger support is obtained for theories of remarriage that emphasize the
role of meeting and mating opportunities in the remarriage market. Men and
women who work and who are more actively integrated in society are more
likely to repartner than others. Further confirmation of our interpretation of
these effects in terms of marriage-market opportunities is obtained by
comparing the competing risks of finding a partner in different contexts. Labor-
force participation affects only the odds of finding a new spouse at work and
not the odds of finding a partner in other ways. Similarly, leisure activities
primarily affect the odds of finding a new spouse in leisure or in public places,
not the odds of finding a spouse in other ways. Effects of children also point in
the direction of marriage market opportunities, at least for women. We find
that only resident children have the expected negative effect on repartnering,
not children who already live on their own. In addition, we find that having
children at home primarily affects the odds of finding a partner at work or in
leisure contexts, and not the odds of finding a partner through one’s network.
We originally proposed three reasons that the study of remarriage is
important. In concluding, we assess for each of these reasons what our study
has taught us. First, the study of remarriage is considered important because
of the implied selection effects in the study of the consequences of divorce
(Duncan & Hoffman 1985; Smock 1990). Our study shows that remarriage is
indeed selective, though not so much in a socioeconomic sense. Our findings
imply that estimates of the consequences of divorce will be too negative if one
looks at single divorced people only. This implication, however, applies
primarily when one studies the social consequences of divorce, not when one
studies the economic consequences of divorce. The exception lies in men’s
labor-force participation, which has a strong positive effect on repartnering.
Second, we argued that the study of repartnering could make a
contribution to the debate about the decline of the marriage institution
(Bumpass 1990). Our study shows that repartnering occurs frequently after
divorce, which does not suggest that divorce in some sense fosters a more
individualistic orientation in society. Many of those who repartner, however,
cohabit without being married. This seems to support the more pessimistic
conclusions authors have drawn about marriage. We also find that remarriage
rates for men have declined, and although this downward trend is fully
compensated by a rise in cohabitation, it does signal a weakening institution
of marriage.
Third, we argued that the study of remarriage provides better opportunities
to test prevailing theories of marriage than the study of first marriage, which
is often preoccupied with variations in marriage timing. After all, when
analyzing remarriage, remaining single is a much more common outcome. If
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this is the design one uses, we come to the following conclusions. Our
competing-risk models for cohabitation and marriage after divorce have offered
novel support for cultural theories of marriage, and our competing-risk models
for finding a new spouse in alternative contexts have offered novel support for
social theories of marriage formation. In our design, economic arguments about
sex-role specialization and financial needs seem to be less relevant for marriage
formation.
References
Allison, Paul D. 1982. “Discrete-Time Methods for the Analysis of Event Histories.” Pp. 61-98 in
Sociological Methodology, edited by Samuel Leinhardt. Jossey-Bass.
Amato, Paul R. 2000. “The Consequences of Divorce for Adults and Children.” Journal of Marriage
and the Family 62:1269-87.
Ambert, Anne-Marie. 1985. “The Effect of Divorce on Women’s Attitude toward Feminism.”
Sociological Focus 18:265-72.
Barber, Jennifer S., and William T. Axinn. 1998. “Gender Role Attitudes and Marriage among
Young Women.” Sociological Quarterly 39:11-31.
Becker, Gary S. 1981. A Treatise on the Family. Harvard University Press.
Becker, Gary S., Elisabeth M. Landes, and Robert T. Michael. 1977. “An Economic Analysis of
Marital Instability.” Journal of Political Economy 85:1141-87.
Bumpass, Larry J. 1990. “What’s Happening to the Family? Interactions between Demographic
and Institutional Change.” Demography 27:483-98.
Bumpass, Larry J., and James A. Sweet. 1989. “National Estimates of Cohabitation.” Demography
26:615-24.
Bumpass, Larry J., James A. Sweet, and Teresa Castro Martin. 1990. “Changing Patterns of
Remarriage.” Journal of Marriage and the Family 52:747-56.
Cherlin, Andrew J. 1978. “Remarriage As an Incomplete Institution.” American Journal of Sociology
84:634-51.
———. 1992. Marriage, Divorce, Remarriage. Rev. ed. Harvard University Press.
Cherlin, Andrew J., and Frank F. Furstenberg Jr. 1994. “Stepfamilies in the United States: A
Reconsideration.” Annual Review of Sociology 20:359-81.
Chiswick, Carmel U., and Evelyn L. Lehrer. 1990. “On Marriage-Specific Human Capital: Its
Role As a Determinant of Remarriage.” Journal of Population Economics 3:193-213.
Clarkberg, Marin, Ross M. Stolzenberg, and Linda J. Waite. 1995. “Attitudes, Values, and Entrance
into Cohabitational versus Marital Unions.” Social Forces 74:609-32.
Coleman, Marilyn, Lawrence Ganong, and Mark Fine. 2000. “Reinvestigating Remarriage:
Another Decade of Progress.” Journal of Marriage and the Family 62:1288-1307.
Curtis, James E., Edward G. Grabb, and Douglas E. Baer. 1992. “Voluntary Association
Membership in Fifteen Countries: A Comparative Analysis.” American Sociological Review
57:139-52.
1496 / Social Forces  81:4, June 2003
De Graaf, Paul M., and Hedwig Vermeulen. 1997. “Female Labour-Market Participation in the
Netherlands: Developments in the Relationship between Family Cycle and Employment.”
Pp. 191-209 in Between Equalization and Marginalization: Women Working Part-Time in
Europe and the United States of America, edited by Hans-Peter Blossfeld and Catherine
Hakim. Oxford University Press.
Duncan, Greg J., and Saul D. Hoffman. 1985. “A Reconsideration of the Economic Consequences
of Marital Dissolution.” Demography 22:485-97.
England, Paula, and George Farkas. 1986. Households, Employment, and Gender: A Social,
Economic, and Demographic View. Aldine de Gruyter.
Esveldt, Ingrid, Gijs Beets, Kène Henkens, Aart C. Liefbroer, and Hein Moors. 2001. Meningen
en opvattingen van de bevolking over aspecten van het bevolkingsvraagstuk (Opinions and
attitudes about aspects of the population problem). Netherlands Interdisciplinary
Demographic Institute.
Furstenberg, Frank F., and Andrew J. Cherlin. 1991. Divided Families: What Happens to Children
When Parents Part. Harvard University Press.
Gerstel, Naomi. 1988. “Divorce, Gender, and Social Integration.” Gender and Society 2:343-67.
Goldscheider, Francis K., and Linda J. Waite. 1986. “Sex Differences in the Entry into Marriage.”
American Journal of Sociology 92:91-109.
Kalmijn, Matthijs. 1998. “Intermarriage and Homogamy: Causes, Patterns, Trends.” Annual
Review of Sociology 24:395-421.
Kalmijn, Matthijs, Paul M. de Graaf, and Wilfred Uunk. 2000. Codeboek van het survey Scheiding
in Nederland 1998 (Codebook for the Survey Divorce in the Netherlands 1998). ICS
Occasional Papers and Document Series—ICS Codebooks 40. Department of Sociology,
Utrecht University.
Kalmijn, Matthijs, and Henk Flap. 2001. “Assortative Meeting and Mating: Unintended
Consequences of Organized Settings for Partner Choices.” Social Forces 79:1289-312.
Klein, Thomas. 1990. “Wiederheirat nach Scheidung in der Bundesrepublik” (Remarriage after
divorce in Germany). Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 42:60-80.
Koo, Helen, and C.M. Suchindran. 1980. “Effects of Children on Women’s Remarriage Prospects.”
Journal of Family Issues 1:497-515.
Koo, Helen, C.M. Suchindran, and Janet D. Griffith. 1984. “The Effects of Children on Divorce
and Re-marriage: A Multivariate Analysis of Life Table Probabilities.” Population Studies
38:451-71.
Lampard, Richard, and Kay Peggs. 1999. “Repartnering: The Relevance of Parenthood and Gender
to Cohabitation and Remarriage among the Formerly Married.” British Journal of Sociology
50:443-65.
Laumann, Edward O., John H. Gagnon, Robert T. Michael, and Stuart Michaels. 1994. The Social
Organization of Sexuality: Sexual Practices in the United States. University of Chicago Press.
Lehrer, Evelyn L., and Carmel U. Chiswick. 1993. “Religion As a Determinant of Marital Stability.”
Demography 30:385-403.
Lichter, Daniel T., Diane K. McLaughlin, George Kephart, and David J. Landry. 1992. “Race
and the Retreat from Marriage: A Shortage of Marriageable Men?” American Sociological
Review 57:781-99.
Liefbroer, Aart C. 1991. “The Choice between a Married and Unmarried First Union for Young
Adults: A Competing Risk Analysis.” European Journal of Population 7:273-98.
 Alternative Routes in the Remarriage Market / 1497
Liefbroer, Aart C., and Jenny de Jong Gierveld. 1993. “The Impact of Rational Considerations
and Perceived Opinions on Young Adults’ Union Formation Intentions.” Journal of Family
Issues 14:213-35.
Manting, Dorien. 1994. “Dynamics in Marriage and Cohabitation: An Inter-temporal, Life
Course Analysis of First Union Formation and Dissolution.” Amsterdam: Thesis.
Marsden, Peter V., John Shelton Reed, Michael D. Kennedy, and Kandi M. Stinson. 1982.
“American Regional Cultures and Differences in Leisure Time Activities.” Social Forces
60:1023-49.
Matthijs, Koen. 1987. “Hertrouwen of samenwonen na echtscheiding: Een
statusintegratiehypothese” (Remarriage or cohabitation after divorce: A status integration
hypothesis). Tijdschrift voor Sociologie 8:69-102.
Milardo, Robert M. 1987. “Changes in Social Networks of Women and Men following Divorce:
A Review.” Journal of Family Issues 8:78-96.
Mott, Frank L., and Sylvia F. Moore. 1983. “The Tempo of Remarriage among Young American
Women.” Journal of Marriage and the Family 41:427-36.
Oppenheimer, Valerie K. 1988. “A Theory of Marriage Timing: Assortative Mating under Varying
Degrees of Uncertainty.” American Journal of Sociology 94:563-91.
———. 1997. “Women’s Employment and the Gains to Marriage: The Specialization and Trading
Model of Marriage.” Annual Review of Sociology 23:431-53.
Sixma, Herman, and Wout C. Ultee. 1984. “An Occupational Prestige Scale for the Netherlands
in the Eighties.” Pp. 29-39 in Social Stratification and Mobility in the Netherlands, edited by
Bart F.M. Bakker, Jaap Dronkers, and Harry B.G. Ganzeboom. Amsterdam: SISWO.
Smock, Pamela J. 1990. “Remarriage Patterns of Black and White Women: Reassessing the Role
of Educational Attainment.” Demography 27:467-73.
Spanier, Graham B., and Paul C. Glick. 1980. “Paths to Remarriage.” Journal of Divorce 3:283-
98.
Statistics Netherlands. 1999. Vital Events: Past, Present and Future of the Dutch Population.
Sweeney, Megan M. 1997. “Remarriage of Women and Men after Divorce: The Role of
Socioeconomic Prospects.” Journal of Family Issues 18:479-502.
Thornton, Arland, William G. Axinn, and Daniel H. Hill. 1992. “Reciprocal Effects of Religiosity,
Cohabitation, and Marriage.” American Journal of Sociology 98:628-51.
Uunk, Wilfred. 1999. “Hertrouw in Nederland: Sociaal-demografische determinanten van gehuwd
en ongehuwd samenwonen na echtscheiding” (Remarriage in the Netherlands:
Sociodemographic determinants of married and unmarried cohabitation after divorce).
Mens en Maatschappij 74:99-118.
Van Berkel, Michel, and Nan Dirk de Graaf. 1998. “Married Women’s Economic Dependency in
the Netherlands, 1979-1991.” British Journal of Sociology 49:97-117.
Van Poppel, Frans. 1995. “Widows, Widowers and Remarriage in Nineteenth-Century
Netherlands.” Population Studies 49:421-41.
Wallerstein, Judith S., and Sandra Blakeslee. 1989. Second Chances: Men, Women, and Children
a Decade after Divorce. Ticknor & Fields.
Wu, Zengh. 1994. “Remarriage in Canada: A Social Exchange Perspective.” Journal of Divorce
and Remarriage 21:191-224.
1498 / Social Forces  81:4, June 2003
Wu, Zengh, and T.R. Balakrishnan. 1994. “Cohabitation after Marital Disruption in Canada.”
Journal of Marriage and the Family 56:723-34.
Yamaguchi, Kazuo. 1991. Event History Analysis. Sage Publications.
